Prophète? Non, économiste. Paul Krugman.

Texte écrit en Avril...2006.

WILL THERE BE A DOLLAR CRISIS?
Paul Krugman
April 19, 2006

The United States now has a remarkably large current account deficit, both in absolute terms and as a share of GDP. At the moment we don’t seem to have any difficulty attracting capital inflows sufficient to finance this deficit, but many observers – me included - nonetheless find the deficit worrisome. The worriers see an ominous resemblance between the current U.S. situation and that of developing countries which also went through periods during which capital flows easily financed large current deficits, then experienced “sudden stops” in which capital inflows abruptly ceased, the currency plunged, and the economy experienced a major setback.

Yet there doesn’t seem to be a clear consensus about how to think about the risks of a dollar crisis. A recent issue of Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1:2005) is largely devoted to the issue, and contains excellent, stimulating discussions. Yet the papers seem, in many ways, to be talking past each other – answering different questions, without being clear about their differences. The purpose of this paper is to sort out the major issues. You could say that it’s an attempt to clear my own head on the subject. The idea is to figure out where the various arguments fit, whether they really mean what their proponents claim, and – to the extent possible – how they add up given the available numbers.

Although there are some analysts arguing that the U.S. current account deficit is either sustainable or a statistical illusion – arguments discussed briefly below - I’d argue that the crucial debate isn’t whether the dollar and the U.S. current account deficit must eventually decline; even if the unorthodox views are given the benefit of the doubt, it’s hard to argue that the current levels are indefinitely sustainable. Instead, the debate is or should be about two questions. First, will there be an abrupt fall in the dollar – a dollar
plunge? Second, if there is a dollar plunge, will it be merely embarrassing or a source of major macroeconomic problems?

I don’t offer a full model in this paper. Instead, I offer a reduced-form analysis of the possibility of a dollar plunge, followed by a sketch rather than a model of the ways in which such a plunge might cause macroeconomic trouble. In excuse, I can argue that this is a rough cut at the issues, not an attempt to nail everything down. In addition, there are some conceptual problems in linking the question of whether the dollar will plunge to the question of what will happen if it does. But I do try to tell as consistent a story as I can.

The remainder of the paper is in five parts. The first part argues that investor myopia is key to the question of whether a dollar plunge is likely: the dollar must eventually fall, but it will fall abruptly only if investors haven’t already factored the long-run need for dollar decline into their portfolio decisions. The second part offers an analytical treatment of the question of investor myopia and a potential dollar plunge. The third part introduces some caveats and qualifications to that analysis. The fourth part suggests a framework for thinking about the macroeconomic effects of a dollar plunge, if that’s what’s going to happen. A final section suggests some conclusions and directions for research.

La suite de cet excellent papier sur (Source) : www.econ.princeton.edu/seminars/WEEKLY%20SEMINAR%20SCHEDULE/SPRING_05-06/April_24/Krugman.pdf

Et plus récemment, toujours du même auteur:

Paul Krugman, économiste, New York Times, 15 septembre 2008 :

« Les conséquences de ces opérations de sauvetage rendent nerveux les responsables de la Fed et du Trésor.

Car ils prennent de gros risques avec l’argent des contribuables.

Par exemple, la plus grande partie du portefeuille d’actifs de la Fed est à ce jour engagée en contrepartie de prêts garantis par des collatéraux à la valeur douteuse.

En outre, les responsables s’inquiètent que leurs efforts de sauvetage puissent encourager l’apparition d’encore plus de comportements à risque. A la longue, cela commence à ressembler à : « Pile, je gagne. Face, les contribuables perdent. »